The Price of Belonging

In today’s global economy, money can cross borders far more easily than people can. Yet for those with sufficient capital, cross-border mobility is no longer out of reach. A Caribbean passport costs up to six figures. An EU golden visa may require an investment of €250,000 to €500,000. While millions face years‑long visa processes or are denied movement altogether, borders become negotiable for those who can pay.

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Citizenship-by-investment (CBI) and “golden visa” programmes allow individuals to obtain citizenship or residency in return for financial investment, rather than through long‑term residence or labour participation. Originally expanded by small or debt-pressured states in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, these schemes have grown into a competitive global market. The Henley Passport Index, which ranks passports by visa‑free access, illustrates the sharp mobility gaps that underpin demand for such programmes.

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If access to citizenship is put on the market, what does that imply for sovereignty and global inequality?

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Why This Market Exists

Citizenship has economic value because it determines access to stable legal systems, high-income labour markets, secure property rights, and political protection. In economic terms, citizenship resembles a club good. It is largely non‑rival, since one additional citizen does not usually reduce the mobility value of a passport, but it is strictly excludable because states control entry.

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On the demand side, CBI programmes respond to global inequality in stability and income. Large wage gaps persist between countries, and political institutions vary widely in quality. For wealthy individuals in politically unstable, sanction-prone, or economically volatile states, a second passport functions as insurance, providing an exit option if domestic conditions deteriorate. In this sense, citizenship becomes a way to manage risk across countries rather than just across financial assets.

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On the supply side, many states offering CBI or golden visa schemes face structural constraints. Small economies with narrow tax bases, high debt burdens, or limited export capacity cannot easily compete in global manufacturing or high-value services. Therefore, selling legal access becomes an alternative revenue strategy, as states effectively “export” membership instead of goods or services. Additionally, such programmes fund infrastructure and reduce reliance on volatile sectors such as tourism. In several Caribbean states, CBI revenues have made up a double‑digit share of GDP, reaching nearly 30 percent of GDP in Dominica in recent years and about 37 percent of GDP in FY2022/23, providing a crucial buffer after natural disasters or tourism slumps.

 

The Immediate Trade-Offs

However, these programmes come with significant trade-offs.

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First, revenue from these investor schemes can be unstable. Demand often increases during global uncertainty, but can decline quickly if regulations tighten or political conditions change; Spain, for instance, has suspended its golden visa scheme, and EU‑level pressure has pushed Malta to wind down direct CBI. Governments that depend on these programmes tie part of their fiscal stability to highly mobile individuals who can move their attention and their money elsewhere at short notice.

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Second, golden visa schemes that rely on property investment may contribute to housing price inflation, especially in smaller markets. In Portugal, real estate routes once made up most golden visa investment and were linked to price pressures in cities such as Lisbon and Porto, prompting reforms that phased out the property option. Capital may flow into real estate instead of into productive sectors such as manufacturing or innovation. This raises the question of whether investors are contributing to long-term growth or simply purchasing access.

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Third, reputational and governance risks are significant. Weak due diligence can expose states to accusations of enabling money laundering or sanctions evasion, which is why international bodies have highlighted CBI/RBI schemes as potential channels for tax evasion and illicit finance. Even when programmes operate legally, the perception that citizenship is for sale can generate domestic resentment and international scrutiny. In the EU, legal and political challenges to investor citizenship schemes have been justified partly by concerns about security and the integrity of shared borders.

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Finally, another trade‑off concerns how these programmes interact with global tax fairness. Wealthy individuals can build fortunes using the labour, infrastructure, and resources of one country, then use CBI or golden visas to shift residence to lower‑tax jurisdictions while retaining access to public goods at home. This ability to separate where wealth is made from where obligations are owed can leave origin states with narrower tax bases and deepen the sense that the gains from globalisation are privatised by a mobile elite, while its costs remain with those who cannot leave.

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What Changes When Citizenship is Priced

When citizenship can be bought, the consequences reach beyond government revenue and into how inequality, sovereignty, and political membership may evolve in the future. Global wage differences persist partly because borders restrict labour movement, and citizenship determines who can access these legal and economic protections. When citizenship becomes purchasable, wealth increasingly substitutes for birthplace: those with capital can secure mobility and protection in multiple jurisdictions, while those without remain bound to the passport they inherit.

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This market for passports also sharpens inequalities in how mobility is distributed. For the wealthy, a six‑figure investment can shorten or even bypass the long queues for residency and citizenship that most migrants face, turning what is for many a years‑ or decades‑long process into an administrative transaction. When some can effectively buy secure status and visa‑free travel while others remain stuck in precarious, temporary arrangements, the sense of unfairness can feed domestic resentment and deepen wealth inequality within countries as well as between them, with potential knock‑on effects for social cohesion and political stability. The immediate beneficiaries are often property developers, financial intermediaries, and segments of the urban elite, reinforcing existing class hierarchies even as programmes are defended in the language of national development.

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Looking ahead, the implications extend to political accountability and reform. When exit is easy for economic elites, the most influential actors can avoid the costs of weak institutions rather than push to change them. At the same time, states that rely on attracting wealthy investors may feel compelled to continually adjust regulatory and fiscal rules to remain competitive.

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The bigger question is not just whether these programmes raise revenue, but whether pricing membership changes how states act and deepens the divide between those who can buy security and those who cannot. In this sense, CBI creates a form of representation without meaningful residence for investors, while many long‑term migrants remain in the opposite position: living, working, and paying taxes without full political voice. The market for membership thus sits uneasily alongside democratic ideas about who the political community is for.

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Conclusion

CBI and golden visa schemes are often defended as practical tools to raise revenue, diversify economies, and cushion external shocks. Yet their significance extends beyond fiscal strategy. By attaching a price to access stable institutions, legal protection, and mobility, these programmes expose how unevenly security and opportunity are distributed in the global economy. As more states experiment with monetising entry, it becomes easier to treat membership as an economic instrument rather than a shared political bond, blurring the line between citizen and customer, and reframing sovereignty as something that can be strategically leveraged.

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The central issue, then, is less about whether these programmes will persist, and more about what kind of citizenship they normalise if they do. If access to protection and mobility increasingly depends on wealth, the gap between those able to secure safety across borders and those constrained by the passport they inherit is likely to widen further.

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References

1. Clerides, Sofronis, Maria Delgado Coelho, Alexander D Klemm, and Christos Kotsogiannis. 2025. “Drivers and Effects of Residence and Citizenship by Investment.” International Monetary Fund. January 10, 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2025/01/11/Drivers-and-Effects-of-Residence-and-Citizenship-by-Investment-560562.

2. Elad, Barry. 2025. “Golden Visa Statistics 2026: Where the Wealth Flows.” CoinLaw. December 26, 2025. https://coinlaw.io/golden-visa-statistics/.

3. Handy, Gemma. 2025. “The Caribbean Islands That Give You a Passport If You Buy a Home.” BBC News, July 27, 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cly88xg5d9vo.

4. Ledsom, Alex. 2026. “The Golden Visa Trends Shaping 2026.” Forbes, January 1, 2026. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexledsom/2026/01/01/golden-visa-programs-in-2025-key-insights-and-predictions-for-2026/.

5. Roy, Diana. 2024. “Golden Passports and Visas: How Investment Migration Works.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 21, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/golden-passports-and-visas-how-investment-migration-works.

6. Surak, Kristin. 2022. “Golden Passports and Visas: The Global Market in Residence and Citizenship.” London School of Economics and Political Science. March 15, 2022. https://www.lse.ac.uk/research/research-for-the-world/politics/golden-visas-and-passports-the-global-market-in-residence-and-citizenship.